- Wednesday, September 24, 2008
- Subscriber Log In
Subscriber Log In
- Home
- U.S.
- World
- Business
- Markets
- Tech
- Personal Finance
- Life & Style
- Opinion
- Careers
- Real Estate
- Small Business
-
Dow Jones Reprints: This copy is for your personal, non-commercial use only. To order presentation-ready copies for distribution to your colleagues, clients or customers, use the Order Reprints tool at the bottom of any article or visit www.djreprints.com
See a sample reprint in PDF format. Order a reprint of this article now
- OPINION
- SEPTEMBER 24, 2008
Let's Get the Bank Rescue Right
By R. GLENN HUBBARD, HAL SCOTT and LUIGI ZINGALES
The financial system is the heart of our economy and it is in trouble. If we do not fix it soon, we risk a serious recession.
The Bush administration appears to understand the urgency, but the draft legislation it put forward over the past week is cause for concern. Under the administration plan, the secretary of the Treasury would have unprecedented and unfettered power to spend $700 billion in purchasing mortgage-related assets from U.S. and possibly foreign financial institutions. The definition of "financial institution" seems to be expanding to include hedge funds and other investors. While Congress clearly understands the urgency of passing legislation to avoid a financial meltdown, some hard questions need to be answered before taking this radical step.
The administration's announced willingness to take bold action should temporarily stabilize the market. If the Fed continues its aggressive lending and announces that any further failures of institutions would be appropriately handled, there will not be Armageddon. We would then have the opportunity to ponder our next move, without rushing a plan through Congress that will affect both the financial system and taxpayers for decades to come.
Any solution should observe three guiding principles: It should (1) restore the stability of the financial system quickly and at the lowest possible cost to the taxpayer; (2) punish those who are responsible for losses; and (3) address the root cause of the crisis -- the price collapse in the residential real-estate market. In doing so, the solution should respect the rule of law by spelling out the proposal in sufficient detail for the Congress and the electorate to pass judgment. To the extent possible, it should follow proven precedents.
The administration's current proposal fails to meet these principles. The Treasury's plan has three significant problems:
First, there is the central issue of how to price the assets. When the subprime crisis hit in the summer of 2007, the Treasury's first response was to encourage the private sector to create a fund -- the so-called "Super SIV" (structured investment vehicle) -- to buy mortgage-related assets. This proposal foundered due to the difficulty of setting a price for these assets which come in complex and incomparable varieties.
Subsequent efforts to establish a price have not been successful. In fact, markets have frozen up largely due to the difficulty of pricing them. The Treasury plan does create a large and willing buyer, an element missing in the markets until now. But at what price? If Treasury pays close to par, (as Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke seemed to suggest at the Senate hearing yesterday), it is paying far too much. If it pays current prices, no one will sell due to the impact on their capital. If it pulls a price out of a hat, it will be acting arbitrarily. The proposal needs to articulate the price-setting process.
Although a reverse auction has been suggested, with asset holders "bidding" to sell their mortgage-related securities to the Treasury, such an approach raises significant problems. Most significant is the risk posed by asymmetric information regarding the value of these securities. Because the holders of complex and incomparable mortgage-related securities have more information regarding their worth than does Treasury, Treasury is at a huge disadvantage and will likely overpay. Moreover, there will have to be many auctions of very different securities. All of this will take time to effectuate. These auctions cannot be done next week.
A second issue is whether we are better served by buying assets or institutions. The stand-alone purchase of mortgage-related assets from solvent as well as struggling financial institutions, as contemplated by the current Treasury plan, raises two basic concerns. In principle, why should losses (particularly in solvent institutions) be borne by taxpayers rather than the shareholders and debt holders? The bill put forward by Sen. Christopher Dodd on Monday somewhat mitigates this concern. It gives the Treasury contingent equity or debt interests in the financial institutions from which it purchases distressed assets in the event Treasury loses money on the resale of the assets. The Treasury's plan also provides flexibility to take this approach, and we would urge the secretary to take advantage of that flexibility if this proposal were to pass.
How can we design a transparent asset purchase process that avoids arbitrariness and potential favoritism? Any such process will have to be designed from scratch, because there is no U.S. precedent for such a targeted purchase of bad assets. The Resolution Trust Corporation and the Depression-era Reconstruction Finance Corporation both entailed government ownership of failed institutions.
The final problem is potential cost. The costs to the U.S. economy of inaction are large, with potentially significant drops of economic activity in credit-sensitive sectors and deterioration in the balance sheets of households, financial firms and nonfinancial businesses. The fiscal costs of inaction are also large, including a significant decline in business and household tax receipts, and increased federal spending due to automatic stabilizers.
The fiscal costs of action, however, are substantial. The Treasury has estimated a cost of $700 billion, and some prominent economists have estimated costs exceeding $1 trillion. The actual cost could even be larger. It is estimated that some $1.4 trillion in non-Agency backed mortgage-related securities were outstanding at the end of 2007, not including unsecuritized mortgages.
Efficient institutional design can reduce the share of costs borne by taxpayers, while repairing the financial system's ability to match borrowers and lenders and provide risk-sharing, liquidity and information services. Keeping costs down is important, as such a large increase in taxpayer support will constrain significantly, if not overwhelmingly, the fiscal initiatives of the next president.
Bold action can be designed with lower costs to taxpayers, while accomplishing the goals Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson has laid out. Elected officials should act quickly -- but carefully.
Mr. Hubbard, dean of Columbia Business School, was chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers under President George W. Bush. Mr. Scott is professor of international financial systems at Harvard Law School. Mr. Zingales is professor of finance at the Graduate School of Business at the University of Chicago.
Please add your comments to the Opinion Journal forum.
Copyright 2008 Dow Jones & Company, Inc. All Rights Reserved
This copy is for your personal, non-commercial use only. Distribution and use of this material are governed by our Subscriber Agreement and by copyright law. For non-personal use or to order multiple copies, please contact Dow Jones Reprints at 1-800-843-0008 or visit
- Printer Friendly
- Order Reprints
-
- Share:
Related Articles and Blogs from WSJ.com
Treasury Has No Authority to Coerce the Banks
OCT 17. 2008'Distasteful' Capital
OCT 15. 2008What Paulson Is Trying to Do
OCT 15. 2008Next President to Inherit New Powers -- and Problems
OCT 15. 2008
Related News From the Web
Email Newsletters and Alerts
The latest news and analysis delivered to your in-box. Check the boxes below to sign up.
Thank you !
You will receive in your inbox
Email Newsletters and Alerts
The latest news and analysis delivered to your in-box. Check the boxes below to sign up.
- New! To sign up for Keyword or Symbol Alerts click here.
- To view or change all of your email settings, visit the Email Setup Center.
Thank you !
You will receive in your inbox.
People Who Viewed This Also Viewed...
- Obama Camp Charges GOP with 'Partisan Plot' to Suppress Votes19223675 (no summary)
- Deflation, Ben Bernanke and the Famous Helicopter19236492 (no summary)
- The Incredibly Shrinking Hedge Fund Industry19223302 (no summary)
- An Update on the Lehman Bankruptcy, By the Numbers19223604 (no summary)
- Afternoon Reading: GM-Chrysler. A Studebaker-Packard Replay?19223536 (no summary)
- Dispatch From Iceland: 'We Might Lose Our Country'19195051 Amid broad turmoil in Iceland, sometimes the plight of the average citizen gets lost. Sigr...Seen by 2 friends |Investment Banking|New York
- McCain Invites 'Joe the Plumber' to a Campaign Event19223880 Don't be surprised if "Joe the Plumber" shows up on the campaign trail with John McCain, ...Seen by 9 friends | |San Francisco
- Two in Ten Days: Sarah Palin's Press Avail19223705 (no summary)Seen by 2 friends | |MIT
You're seeing a preview of SeenThis? — a Facebook application that helps you discover the latest news, videos and more by showing you what's popular with your friends — both on Facebook, and on sites like this one.
Have a Facebook account? Get recommendations for content popular with your friends by adding the SeenThis? app.
Once you've added it, look for the "Your Facebook Friends Are Reading" section in the sidebar.
More in Opinion
Most Popular
- 1.
FDIC Chief Raps Rescue for Helping Banks Over Homeowners68 comments
- 2.
Two Families Named McCain62 comments
- 3.
As Joe the Plumber Grows Famous, the Politics Get Murkier44 comments
- 4.
Obama, McCain Trade Jabs Over Taxes, Tone of Campaign44 comments
- 5.
Now Boarding: Illegal Immigrants On One-Way Tickets Home36 comments
Journal Community
Hello
Your question to the Journal Community Your comments on articles will show your real name and not a username.Why?
Why use your real name? The Journal Community encourages thoughtful dialogue and meaningful connections between real people. We require the use of your full name to authenticate your identity. The quality of conversations can deteriorate when real identities are not provided.
Create a Journal Community profile to avoid this message in the future. (As a member you agree to use your real name when participating in the Journal Community)
Notice:
Your participation access with Journal Community has been disabled due to violation of Journal Community Guidelines.
If you feel you have reached this status change in error, please contact TBD@wsj.com
- back to top
-
WSJ.com Account:
Help & Information Center:
-
About:
-
WSJ.com:
-
Tools & Formats:
-
Digital Network
- WSJ.com
- Marketwatch.com
- Barrons.com
- AllThingsD.com
- FiLife.com
- BigCharts.com
- Virtual Stock Exchange
- WSJ Asia
- WSJ Europe
Foreign language editions:
- WSJ Chinese
- WSJ Portuguese
- WSJ Spanish